

# **Worst Weapons In Worst Hands:** **U.S. Inaction On The Nuclear Terror Threat Since 9/11,** **And A Path Of Action**

**The National Security Advisory Group**  
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# WORST WEAPONS IN WORST HANDS: U.S. INACTION ON THE NUCLEAR TERROR THREAT SINCE 9/11, AND A PATH OF ACTION

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## THREE YEARS AFTER 9/11, SLEEPWALKING ON WMD

- The gravest threat facing Americans today is a terrorist detonating a nuclear bomb in one of our cities. The National Security Advisory Group (NSAG) judges that the Bush administration is taking insufficient actions to counter this threat.
  - If this catastrophe were to occur, what would we wish we had done to prevent it?
  - Why are those actions not being taken today?
- President Bush has aptly noted that keeping the worst weapons – WMD – out of the hands of the worst people – terrorists – is an American president’s highest priority.
  - In the first presidential debate, the moderator asked the two candidates, “What is the single most serious threat to the national security of the U.S.?” Kerry and Bush agreed: nuclear terrorism. As the President said, “I agree with my opponent that the biggest threat facing the country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist network.”
  - In the final weeks of the campaign, Vice President Cheney made nuclear terrorism a centerpiece of his stump speech, arguing that “the biggest threat we face now as a nation is the possibility of terrorists ending up in the middle of one of our cities with deadlier weapons than have ever been used against us... nuclear weapons able to threaten the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans.” According to Cheney, "That's the ultimate threat. For us to have a strategy that's capable of defeating that threat, you've got to get your mind around that concept."
- The NSAG agrees. Yet on the record to date, we judge that the U.S. government has not made the connections between these words and the necessary actions.
- The administration is fighting a global war on terror, but not yet a global war on WMD.
- This NSAG report details the actions that would constitute such a global war on WMD.
- The NSAG’s advice is directed to the American public, to the administration, and to members of Congress of both parties.

## REPORT CARD ON ACTIONS TO COUNTER WMD AFTER 9/11

### Actions taken

- The invasion of Iraq was the principal action taken to counter WMD after 9/11, but, in fact, no WMD were found.
- The renunciation of WMD by Qaddafi's Libya was a major success of U.S. and British cooperative diplomacy extending over two administrations.
- The exposure of the A.Q. Khan network by member states of the Proliferation Security Initiative stopped some trafficking in WMD technology, but an unknown amount is unaccounted for and the black market may still be functioning.

### Serious setbacks

- North Korea quadrupled its nuclear arsenal with impunity, and may now be so emboldened by U.S. acquiescence that it cannot be turned back.
- Iran has retained its nuclear program for four years since 9/11, with the U.S. response limited to rhetoric, finally giving belated and tepid support for a European-led initiative. Iranian nuclear ambitions have become more entrenched because of U.S. inaction.

### Inaction

- Efforts to secure "loose nukes," like the Nunn-Lugar program, are little changed from their pre-9/11 levels.
- Diplomatic efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty were touted by President Bush but have not produced results.

**This NSAG memo describes actions that can be taken to expedite the securing of all "loose nukes", to strengthen the NPT system and to reverse the setbacks U.S. nuclear security has already suffered from North Korea and Iran.**

# NORTH KOREA'S RUNAWAY NUCLEAR PROGRAM: OUT OF CONTROL SINCE 9/11

## The Growing Danger to America

- North Korea's runaway nuclear program could be a direct path to nuclear terror:
  - By sale: North Korea sells missiles and other dangerous technology worldwide, with no apparent limits or compunction.
  - By criminal diversion: North Korea's leaders and elite engage in smuggling, counterfeiting, and other illicit activities. These same people might traffic in nuclear materials the way A.Q. Khan trafficked in Pakistan's nuclear technology.
  - By collapse: The North Korean regime could implode if it stays on its current stifling economic path, or suffer a chaotic transition if it undertakes needed reform (like the collapse of the Soviet Union). In either scenario, its nuclear arsenal could "break loose."
- To the risk of terrorism must, of course, be added the obvious danger of nuclear weapons in the hands of the North Korean government itself. Nukes in leader Kim Jong Il's hands:
  - Weaken deterrence on the Korean peninsula, increasing the chance of a horrible war,
  - Risk a domino effect of proliferation in East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan),
  - And jeopardize the entire global non-proliferation system, unleashing more nuclear programs and thereby more sources of potential nuclear terrorism.
- Apart from these nuclear dangers, failure to stop a development the United States has called "unacceptable" and failure to exert leadership in a group we ourselves have created (China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia in the Six-Party Talks), could cripple the entire U.S. strategic position in East Asia.

## The Record since 9/11

- Since 9/11, in the face of North Korea's runaway nuclear program, U.S. policymakers:
  - Did nothing as North Korea crossed redline after redline;
  - Claimed credit for diplomatic process (the Six-Party Talks) but have taken no responsibility for total lack of results;
  - Attempted to outsource the issue to China and then blame the failure on China;
  - Tried to blame the Clinton administration, the administration that actually stopped plutonium production in North Korea.
    - The scorecard
      - ◆ Bush I: one to two bombs' worth of plutonium
      - ◆ Clinton: zero plutonium
      - ◆ Bush II: 4-6 nuclear weapons' worth of plutonium and counting

- The current U.S. administration says it is pursuing a diplomatic path to stop the North Korean nuclear program, but the facts are not consistent with this claim:
  - President Bush has apparently not resolved the bureaucratic dispute between those in his administration who favor diplomacy and those who favor an alternative strategy of pressure or regime change;
  - U.S. negotiators have therefore been sent out with (a) no negotiating position (Assistant Secretary of State Kelly's first three rounds), (b) a bureaucratic compromise position that is vague and indecisive (Kelly's fourth round), (c) a ban on talking directly to the North Koreans;
  - U.S. leaders make statements about North Korean absolute leader Kim Jong Il that seem deliberately intended to undermine the diplomatic path.
- In the absence of a U.S. strategy, American options have narrowed. The U.S. is in a far worse position to stop North Korea diplomatically than it was on 9/11.
  - The plutonium at Yongbyon is out – and the North Koreans say they are making bombs with it;
  - More plutonium is in the making at the Yongbyon reactor;
  - An unchecked uranium enrichment program has had four years to grow;
  - North Korea is boasting of becoming a nuclear power;
  - Except for Japan, the parties the Bush administration brought together to deal with North Korea are all criticizing the U.S. rather than following its leadership.

#### **What Should Be Done Now: An Alternative Diplomatic and Military Strategy**

- The Six-Party Talks are set to resume late in July, after being stalled for over a year. During this time North Korea's nuclear program has continued.
- North Korea might still be stopped diplomatically through the Six-Party talks, but to have a chance:
  - President Bush must put an end to the debate within his administration between those who favor diplomacy and those who favor pressure/regime change;
  - Diplomacy or pressure/regime change is not a choice; it is a sequence;
  - The U.S. should devise a Plan A for diplomatic success to employ first, and then a contingent Plan B for pressure to use if diplomacy fails;
  - Plan B serves two purposes: to aid Plan A by showing North Korea the penalty for failing to end its nuclear program; and to create a realistic prospect of containing and ultimately eliminating the nuclear threat from North Korea.
- Plan A should include:
  - A U.S.-crafted position coordinated with China, Russia, and our allies;
  - A results-oriented tempo of diplomacy: frequent meetings (certainly not once per year), at which U.S. negotiators participate actively, and progress or lack of progress is clearly recorded;
  - An objective of total elimination of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, with fully adequate verification;
  - U.S. willingness to:
    - Pledge not to attack North Korea;
    - Renounce efforts to force a regime change;

- Provide Nunn-Lugar-type assistance for dismantlement; and Progressively deepen diplomatic and economic relations.
- South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia willingness to offer economic and political inducements;
- At this late date in North Korea's nuclear program, it is not clear that North Korea can be persuaded to give up its aspirations for nuclear weapons, so it might be necessary to turn to pressure (Plan B). But the success of Plan B's political and economic dimensions depend on cooperation from China and South Korea, which will not be forthcoming unless they believe that Plan A has been tried and failed; thus a failure to pursue diplomacy via Plan A will make any Plan B ineffective.
- Plan B should combine containment and pressure.
  - Political pressure to deprive the North Korean government of international legitimacy and to undermine it within its borders;
  - Economic pressure via sanctions and embargo, assisted by as many nations as the United States can enlist; and aggressive prosecution of the wide range of illicit activities sponsored by the North Korean government;
  - Military pressure to include the threat of strikes on North Korean WMD production, testing, and deployment facilities;
  - Robust steps to enhance deterrence of attack by North Korea upon any other nation.

Sadly, the developments in North Korea's nuclear weapon program during the U.S. inaction these past few years has made Plan A less likely of success, and Plan B more difficult to implement.

## IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: MORE ENTRENCHED SINCE 9/11

### The Growing Danger to America

- Iran's devious behavior indicates that it is racing to join the nuclear weapons club:
  - Long hidden ambitions: Iran concealed significant enrichment activities for almost two decades although it claims only to want to assure its fuel supply for seven planned civilian nuclear reactors to be built by 2020.
  - Serial confessor: Iran has shamelessly lied about many aspects of its program until confronted with solid evidence to the contrary.
  - #1 state sponsor of terror: Iran has meddled in Iraq and Afghanistan, armed militants hostile to Israel and harbored al Qaeda suspects.
- A nuclear Iran threatens regional and global security by:
  - Escalating fears of vulnerability: Iran's missiles are capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to Israel and Europe and to U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  - Increasing the chance of a domino effect: nuclear aspirants including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria to acquire nuclear weapons.
  - Endangering world oil supplies.

### The Record since 9/11

- Current U.S. government has no viable plan for stopping Iran.
  - President Bush has said a nuclear Iran is unacceptable – but has made no meaningful effort to stop it.
  - Administration infighting has stalled policy formation.
- U.S. subcontracted the problem to the EU3 (France, UK and Germany) but has provided only lukewarm support to them.
  - EU3 obtained Iran's agreement to suspend temporarily its enrichment activities and adhere to the Additional Protocol during negotiations.
  - Following President Bush's first trip to Europe in 2005, the Administration decided to help Europe sweeten the negotiating pot in exchange for European assurances to support sanctions on Iran if negotiations fail.
  - The fragile agreement hangs by a thread: Iranian public opinion strongly favors pursuing nuclear technology; Iranian officials continuously threaten to resume enrichment; and with the recent presidential election, Iran's pro-nuclear conservatives have further consolidated their power.
- The absence of a feasible U.S. policy has left negotiations weak:
  - EU3 lacks complete U.S. backing necessary to compile a deal-making package.
  - U.S. does not want to be seen as bargaining with Iran.
  - Iran has painted itself into a corner with avowals not to step back from its right to enrich, making an agreement with the EU3 or U.S. improbable.
- A nuclear Iran would be a grave failure of this Administration's policy.

### What Should Be Done Now: An Alternative Diplomatic and Military Strategy

- To achieve any deal the U.S. government must settle on a course of action.
- A five-year global moratorium on all new enrichment and reprocessing, as called for by Mohammed ElBaradei, is the key.
  - Will require international cooperation in assembling both a bundle of carrots and an arsenal of sticks.
  - U.S., the EU3, Russia, and the IAEA need to present Iran with a bargain, packaged as an offer Iran cannot refuse.
  - It would offer cover for Iran to comply with an international obligation without explicitly yielding to American or EU3 demands.
- The doable deal:
  - EU3 delivery of important economic benefits under the terms of an agreement. Iran is eagerly seeking trade and investment.
  - No U.S. objection to the supply of spare parts for U.S.-origin aircraft and negotiations with Iran about its entrance into the WTO.
  - Credible assurances by the U.S. not to attack Iran to change its regime by force – if Iran ceases all work on its reprocessing and enrichment facilities that could support a nuclear weapons program.
  - Slow-rolling of fuel delivery by Russia until Iran agrees to comply with the five-year moratorium.
  - A combined Russian-EU guarantee to give Iran the opportunity to buy additional civilian nuclear reactors.
  - A promise by Russia to provide an internationally-guaranteed supply of fuel for these reactors and removal of spent fuel at bargain prices.
- Carrots are not enough:
  - Iran should be concerned that it has no realistic possibility of making its enrichment and reprocessing facilities operational.
  - Accordingly, Iran should understand the existential threat of a military response under some conditions.

If Iran agrees to the moratorium, in an appropriately verifiable way, and we maintain the status quo on all other issues with Iran (i.e., human rights, being the #1 state sponsor of terrorism), we will be no worse off than we were yesterday on other issues in this relationship.

# LOOSE NUKES IN RUSSIA AND ELSEWHERE: STILL TOO MANY LOOSE AFTER 9/11

## The Danger to America

Paying Russians to take action is no longer effective.

- The logic of prevention needs to be reframed.
  - Putin needs to feel in his gut the existential threat to Moscow of Beslan-caliber terrorists with nuclear weapons.
  - Bush and Putin made some progress on accountability at Bratislava, but more must be done.
- To prevent terrorist nuclear attacks on both New York and Moscow, Russia and the U.S. must jointly:
  - Establish a new “gold standard” by which each nation’s methods of securing its own weapons and material are sufficiently transparent to give others confidence that their stockpiles cannot be used by terrorists.
  - Lock down vulnerable weapons and materials worldwide and clean out those facilities that cannot be locked down.
  - Operate with reciprocal transparency so that both governments can assure one another that their weapons and material are being contained and secured.
- Growing extremism in the Caucasus makes nuclear theft in Russia more likely.
  - Chechens have cased Russian nuclear facilities.
- The top of our agenda must be securing Russian cooperation in preventing terrorists from acquiring nukes.
  - Other concerns, such as Russia’s backsliding on democracy, must be given lesser priority.
  - A successful working relationship requires that both leaders speak candidly about disagreements—such as plutonium disposal liability—and find solutions.

## The Record since 9/11

- In October 2001, Presidents Bush and Putin identified the nexus of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction as the greatest threat to both nations, and pledged “to keep the world’s most dangerous technologies out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous people.”
  - Unfortunately, neither nations’ deeds have matched either president’s words:
    - In the two years after 9/11, fewer potential nuclear weapons in Russia were secured than in the two years before that attack.
  - Alarming reports of nuclear insecurity in Russia and the former Soviet Union continue to emerge.
    - Nuclear security culture in Russia is weak: reports of guards patrolling without ammunition and doors propped open for convenience.
  - In his February 2005 testimony to Congress, CIA Director Porter Goss gave the intelligence community’s best judgment of Russian loose nukes:

- “There is sufficient material unaccounted for so that it would be possible for those with know-how to construct a nuclear weapon.”
- Senator Rockefeller followed up, asking, “Can you assure the American people that the material missing from Russian nuclear sites has not found its way into terrorist hands?” Goss replied, “No, I can't make that assurance.”
- There is also good news:
  - At Bratislava, Presidents Bush and Putin for the first time accepted personal responsibility for addressing nuclear terrorism and assuring that their governments act urgently.
  - There is recent evidence of rising Russian consciousness about preventing nuclear terrorism:
    - Russian President Vladimir Putin, “It is important to neutralize the attempts to proliferate weapons of mass destruction,” Bratislava Summit, February 24, 2005.
    - Chief of the Russian General Staff Yury Baluyevsky, “Nuclear weapons could soon escape the control of the nuclear powers and become accessible throughout the world, and there is an understanding of this at the political and military level in the United States, Russia, and other members of the nuclear club,” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 2, 2005.
  - Two years ago, the U.S. pledged \$10 billion to the G8 Global Partnership. Unfortunately, actual allocation of these funds is still in its infancy.

### **What Should be Done Now: An Alternative Strategy**

- Move from assistance to partnership.
- Accelerate and strengthen U.S.–Russian cooperation.
  - Build Russian commitment to sustain high levels of security once international assistance ends.
  - Agree on what levels of security are needed and what standards should be met.
  - Decide on specific deadlines for when all loose Russian nuclear weapons and materials will be contained and secured.
  - Resolve remaining access and liability issues.
  - Consolidate nuclear stockpiles.
  - Develop nuclear “security culture.”
  - Exchange “best practices” for securing nukes.
  - Work together on nuclear security in the rest of the world to ensure that every weapon and every kilogram of material worldwide is secured and accounted for.
- Improve Nunn–Lugar.
  - Streamline to remove bureaucratic obstacles.
  - Establish who is in charge.

## STRENGTHENING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION SYSTEM: MISSING U.S. LEADERSHIP SINCE 9/11

### The Growing Danger to America

- In 1962, President John F. Kennedy warned that on the current path there could be 20 nuclear weapons states by the end of the 1970's.
  - Because of initiatives he and successive presidents took to prevent that, today there are only 8 nuclear armed states.
  - The centerpiece of the nonproliferation regime that has constrained the spread of nuclear weapons is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
    - In that compact, 184 nations have voluntarily rejected nuclear weapons. These include 40 states like Japan, Germany, Sweden, and Singapore that have the technical infrastructure to build nuclear arsenals quickly, if they chose to do so.
    - Associated agreements, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Proliferation Security Initiative, aim to stop the sale of items and technologies that would assist states – or even terrorist groups – in building nuclear weapons.
  - In the aftermath of 9/11, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1540, which forbids states from assisting WMD proliferation by non-state actors, obligates them to enact and enforce laws to prevent such proliferation, and requires countries to establish and enforce controls over sensitive materials and technologies within their borders.
  - Unfortunately, even in this arena, the Bush Administration has demonstrated disdain for international agreements.

### The Record since 9/11

- The Bush administration has disparaged the NPT regime, saying it has no value for the “good guys” and is inadequate for the “bad guys” who can either not join or join and quit without penalties.
- But even in its current form the NPT contributes to American security.
  - There are not only “good guys” and “bad guys” but in-betweens, represented in recent history by Ukraine, Kazakstan, Belarus (at the time it signed the NPT), South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, and others who turned away from nuclear weapons in part because of the NPT.
  - When the U.S. leads the world against the “bad guys,” it can draw upon the support of the NPT signatories.
- Preventing nuclear breakout and terrorism requires a comprehensive U.S. strategy that uses all tools – we cannot afford to write off any of them.
- Yet the current form of the NPT is not adequate and needs U.S.-led revamping.
  - In the view of the majority of 85 nuclear experts surveyed by Senator Lugar, on the current course, 2-5 new nuclear nations will arise in the next decade.
  - The actions of two countries threaten to collapse - or explode - the nonproliferation regime.

- If Iran goes nuclear under the guise of a civilian program, Egypt might follow, then Saudi Arabia (more likely buying than making) and possibly Syria.
    - If no one stops North Korea from gaining forced entry into the nuclear club, Japan and South Korea might not be far behind. Taiwan will certainly explore its nuclear options.
    - If North Korea and Iran achieve their nuclear ambitions, President Bush will have presided over the collapse of the nonproliferation regime.
  - The opportunity presented at the recent NPT Review Conference to focus international attention on North Korean and Iranian actions that threaten to puncture and even collapse the entire nonproliferation regime was missed by:
    - ◆ Walking away from the 13 steps pledge made by the U.S. at the previous NPT Review Conference,
    - ◆ Failing to appoint a high-level envoy,
    - ◆ Failing to develop an agenda, and
    - ◆ Arriving at the meeting in New York without having assembled a coalition of the like-minded.
  - The U.S. found itself as much a target for others' accusations of non-compliance as did Iran.
  - To revitalize the treaty, the U.S. must appreciate that countries can't be bullied into cooperation – they, like we, act in terms of their views of their own self-interest.
  - Countries weighing the utility of having nuclear weapons will stay in the NPT and forswear nukes for a number of reasons:
    - If the regime is effective in keeping their neighbors from getting the bomb,
    - If the regime provides benefits in access to civilian nuclear technology,
    - If the international nuclear taboo remains strong,
    - If the regime leads to restraint on the part of the nuclear weapon states.
    - If the net balance of other carrots and sticks make such a choice in their interest.
- President Bush gave a speech addressing needed changes to the NPT on February 11, 2004 but – characteristically – there has been little follow-up and no result.

### **What Should be Done Now: An Alternative Strategy**

- The United States should:
  - Adopt four goals as U.S. policy;
  - Develop specific proposals for the U.S. to achieve each goal;
  - Seek international support for each proposal.
- **FIRST GOAL: PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM**
  - The NPT was conceived long before 9/11, and even before the Munich Olympics. It deals with possession of nuclear weapons by governments.
  - But the NPT system of the future must also address “proliferation” to terrorists.

- The key to preventing “proliferation” to terrorists is stopping the production of fissile material for weapons and safeguarding all fissile materials everywhere from terrorists.
- This is a new agenda for nonproliferation. Traditional nonproliferation addresses the problem of diversion of fissile material from non-military purposes to military purposes. The new agenda must address diversion from government-sponsored purposes (military or non-military) to non-governments (terrorists).
- India, Pakistan, and Israel are not members of the NPT and cannot be members, but they can be members of a new understanding addressing the new agenda of preventing proliferation to terrorists.
- This new understanding would commit all governments to:
  - Internationally accepted standards of safe custody and control of fissile materials – standards established in the U.S.-Russian Nunn-Lugar program.
  - Joint action to prevent diversion to terrorists (including but not limited to measures being pursued in the G8 initiative, PSI, and UNSCR 1540).
  - Joint planning for humanitarian and strategic response to a nuclear explosion anywhere in the participating states.
- SECOND GOAL: STOPPING THE PROLIFERATION OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING CAPABILITY
  - Traditionally the NPT has permitted and even encouraged the “peaceful atom,” meaning in particular that parties may enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium. Every aspect of international policy calls for departure from this traditional understanding of the NPT.
    - Nonproliferation. Enrichment and reprocessing allow nations to obtain the critical ingredients of a nuclear weapons capability – fissile material – within the treaty and then “break out” of the treaty to full weapons capability.
    - Counterterrorism. After 9/11, U.S. policy must reflect the fact that every kilogram of uranium or plutonium made anywhere poses a potential danger of nuclear terrorism through theft, sale, or diversion.
    - Energy economics. There is no economic reason for reprocessing or for proliferating uranium enrichment capability today or for decades to come – a fact that was not clear when the NPT was first signed.
    - Energy security. The world will need more nuclear power to fuel a growing demand for electricity without increasing dependence on fossil fuel. The explosion of a nuclear bomb anywhere in the world will cause populations to demand a halt to this needed expansion of nuclear power.
    - Global warming. Nuclear power is a key part of any strategy to contain carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels. Once again, a single nuclear explosion will halt the expansion of peaceful nuclear power.
  - The United States should oppose the proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. In return for foregoing such facilities, countries would be assured access to fuel services by existing providers of such services.

- President Bush's proposal stops short of opposing all such proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing, and he has failed to obtain international agreement even to his limited proposal.
- **THIRD GOAL: STRENGTHENING VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE OF THE NPT**
  - The NPT system needs better means to detect and punish cheating.
  - To detect cheating:
    - The U.S. should provide further financial and technical aid to the IAEA, and to share intelligence with the IAEA wherever possible;
    - The IAEA's inspection rights, obligations, and procedures should be extended from fissile material-producing capabilities to all nuclear weapons-related activities;
    - The U.S. should more actively promote the universal adoption of the Agreed Protocol.
  - To ensure prompt resolution of suspected cheating, states under suspicion should:
    - Have their membership on the IAEA Board of Governors suspended;
    - Have their rights to peaceful nuclear cooperation suspended;
    - Be subject to inspections that go beyond even the Agreed Protocol.
  - To deter and punish cheating, violators who wish to remain members of the NPT automatically:
    - Lose the right to peaceful nuclear cooperation for a period of time;
    - Become subject to extra IAEA inspections in perpetuity.
  - Uncorrected cheating invites the cheater's facilities to physical attack.
- **FOURTH GOAL: PREVENTING "BREAKOUT" OF THE NPT**
  - NPT members should not be permitted to take their nuclear programs right up to the line of compliance and then withdraw from the Treaty and "break out" to a nuclear weapons capability.
  - The fuel cycle provisions of the **SECOND GOAL** go a long way in this direction.
  - But additional measures can be taken. Withdrawal should automatically trigger the following:
    - The UNSC takes the matter of withdrawal up under Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
    - Withdrawing states forfeit any technology they obtained for "peaceful purposes" during their period of membership;
    - During the 90-day period between the announcement of withdrawal and the effective withdrawal date (this period is clearly stated in the Treaty), withdrawing states would be subject to more intrusive inspections than those provided by the Agreed Protocol (to permit the UNSC to make an assessment of their intentions). If it is found during this period of intensive inspection that the state violated its obligations during the time of its membership, it shall, despite its intention to withdraw, nevertheless be treated as though it violated the NPT.