

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 13, 2026

The Honorable Markwayne Mullin
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Avenue, SE
Washington, D.C. 20528

The Honorable Joseph B. Edlow
Director
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
5900 Capital Gateway Drive
Camp Springs, MD 20529

Dear Secretary Mullin and Director Edlow:

On September 8, 2026, Senator Alex Padilla received a protected whistleblower disclosure (the “Disclosure”) that reveals serious allegations of illegal and inappropriate activities within the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS” or “the Department”) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (“FDNS”).

According to the attached Disclosure, the Department and USCIS leadership have abruptly diverted FDNS personnel to an “Unlawful Voter Initiative” using highly questionable data and methods to identify purported unlawful voters. DHS materials admit these investigations will include naturalized U.S. citizens, some of whom will have federal law enforcement records created against them. FDNS employees are expressing concern that they are being directed to take actions that are against the law and Department policy, which will harm Americans. The whistleblower’s Disclosure includes compelling evidence of wrongdoing and abuse of power by agency leadership including:

- (1) USCIS personnel have been directed to access sensitive voter information in violation of state laws prohibiting unauthorized access to individual voter records potentially thousands of times;¹
- (2) USCIS personnel are under significant pressure from headquarters to enter federal TECS² records against individuals that are likely to be false in many cases, potentially harming thousands of people in likely violation of federal privacy requirements;³
- (3) With minimal training, agency leadership is imposing reckless quotas that demand USCIS personnel investigate 40 subjects per day, a rate of roughly 12 minutes per subject, to complete this rushed investigation by September 12;⁴ and,
- (4) USCIS personnel are being tasked with unreliable DHS voter data of dubious origins, that is compiled with “supplemental magic”, which they are required to accept as accurate.⁵

¹ Disclosure Letter to Senator Padilla from Anonymous Whistleblower re: Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Direction to Identify “Unlawful Voters”, (Sept. 8, 2026), 1.

² “TECS” is a system where “users are able to input, access, or maintain law enforcement, inspection, intelligence-gathering, and operational records.” See DHS/CBP/PIA-021 TECS System: Platform, available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhscbppia-021-tecs-system-platform>

³ Disclosure Letter, 1.

⁴ *Id.* at 2.

⁵ *Id.* at 3.

On Friday, August 21, 2026, USCIS FDNS personnel were instructed to drop everything and watch one training video. By the following Tuesday, August 25, they were directed to begin reviewing data provided by DHS to FDNS to hunt for “unlawful voters.” Hundreds of employees have been diverted to chasing the Administration’s unfounded claims of significant noncitizen voting. This sudden surge indicates that the Department’s top priority is now manufacturing evidence for election conspiracy theories, rather than FDNS’s fraud detection and national security mission.

It is notable that these activities come as federal courts have unanimously rejected the Administration’s attempts to coerce states to share their citizens’ voter data.⁶ The Disclosure shows how DHS is deploying federal law enforcement resources to go around those judicial rulings and gather state voter information by any means, regardless of state laws. Further, the Administration’s continued claims of election fraud signal its intent to use this unreliable evidence of “unlawful voters” in ways that can disenfranchise eligible voters, disrupt state and local election administration, and subject election officials to additional unwarranted threats of prosecution.⁷

1. Illegal Access to State Voter Records Using PII

The whistleblower’s Disclosure shows this initiative appears to involve thousands of violations of state laws protecting voter data against unauthorized access. Several states, including Virginia, require a specific attestation that one is authorized to access the voter’s information, under penalty of law.⁸ However, the Department and USCIS are directing assigned personnel to make false claims, using Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from DHS data, on state government websites by affirming that they are the voter or have been authorized by the voter to obtain the desired state voter data. This appears to be a clear-cut violation of state laws regarding access to individual voter information and raises serious questions about federal privacy laws and data policies as well.

As documented by the Disclosure, federal employees are being directed to misrepresent themselves based on questionable guidance from USCIS’s Office of Chief Counsel (“OCC”). This guidance stated that FDNS officers may conduct such searches on these websites as “open-source research for ‘adjudicative or investigative’ purposes,” seemingly disregarding certain states’ laws. This guidance also conflicts with 5 U.S.C. §552a(a)(7), which defines “routine use” “with respect to the disclosure of a record” as “the use of such record for a purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected.” Further, statements made by Department leadership that personnel would not be “personally liable” for conducting these searches indicates a known concern about the legality of these actions.

2. Creation of Erroneous Federal Law Enforcement Records

The Disclosure also outlines the serious consequences for individuals whose information is being reviewed through this initiative. FDNS officers were instructed to create records known as “TECS records” for individuals who have been determined to be “unlawful voters” despite questions from

⁶ Avery Lotz, *DOJ’s voter roll crusade hits a courthouse wall*, Axios (Aug. 5, 2026), <https://www.axios.com/2026/08/05/trump-doj-voter-roll-lawsuits-fail>

⁷ Assistant Attorney General Dhillon Letter to All States’ Chief Election Officials Threatening Prosecution, Example Letter to Michigan Secretary of State Benson (July 7, 2026), available at: <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28425163-20260707-doj-letter-and-memo-voter-eligibility/>

⁸ Disclosure Letter, 1.

officers regarding the source and accuracy of voting and immigration history information to make these determinations. TECS records are law enforcement records maintained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that carry significant downstream impacts on individuals, including naturalized U.S. citizens.

Now, tens of thousands of individuals are being investigated by FDNS officers through this initiative without their knowledge or ability to correct erroneous data. The Department's own training information acknowledges there will be serious flaws in the data, even stating "there will be U.S. citizens in this population."⁹ At a time when immigration enforcement is significantly increasing at airports, U.S. citizens or other lawfully present noncitizens could be referred to secondary inspections by CBP personnel at ports of entry upon return to the United States from legally authorized travel abroad due to a TECS record based on questionable sources. While USCIS' materials caution about the possibility of unreliable data, personnel are nevertheless directed to generate records regardless of whether they believe that the DHS-provided data is correct, which can trigger referrals to Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).

3. Minimal Training and Reckless Quotas Leading to Criminal Investigations

As revealed in the Disclosure, staff were given just one session of training as part of this initiative – consisting only of a video that lasted approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes. Less than 3 business days later, assigned staff were expected to begin reviewing data, with quotas of 5 subjects per hour, or 40 per day over 8 hours. Not only is such a breakneck pace likely to cause fatigue amongst these staff, but it equates to approximately 12 minutes per subject – a completely inadequate timeline for investigating and reconciling multiple Alien Registration Numbers mistakenly or inadvertently issued to an individual, increasing the likelihood of error. Individual cases identified by this initiative can then be taken up by HSI for further action, including criminal investigations.

4. Questionable Source Data Compiled With “Supplemental Magic”

The Disclosure establishes a glaring lack of transparency around the source data provided by the Department for these investigations. The official training video states that the data was compiled with “supplemental magic.” The video also establishes that both headquarters and USCIS personnel understand the shortcomings of both the state voter data and the federal immigration and citizenship data, including individuals with multiple alien numbers, but personnel are required to accept the data even when they believe it to be inaccurate. This use of “supplemental magic” on this data set to create records to be used against citizens shows a shocking disregard for the federal privacy and data laws enacted to protect the American people.

The Department has already shown repeated disregard for the Privacy Act and other laws and policies limiting federal agencies' collection, use, and sharing of individuals' records.¹⁰ The Disclosure shows that some of the data being used to check against state voter rolls comes from the SAVE program. The

⁹ *Appendix*, 25.

¹⁰ *League of Women Voters v. Department of Homeland Security*, No. 25-cv-3501, Order Denying Federal Defendants' Motion for Stay Pending Appeal (D.D.C. July 8, 2026), *aff'd*, Order Denying Federal Defendants' Motion for Stay (D.C. Cir., Sept. 4, 2026).

modified use of SAVE is now barred by a federal court injunction, raising questions about whether the Department is following that court order.¹¹

Continuation of Administration's Baseless Claims of Election Fraud

These activities are especially alarming just weeks before the 2026 midterm elections. They also must be seen in the context of the repeated, unverified claims by President Trump of widespread noncitizen voter fraud, including those made during his July 16, 2026, prime-time address from the White House. Over the past several weeks, *CNN*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *ProPublica* and other outlets have reported on the intense White House pressure on DHS and other agencies to back up the President's baseless claims of widespread election fraud.¹² Now, the Administration appears likely to use the "unlawful voters" supposedly identified with "supplemental magic" in ways that disenfranchise eligible voters and threaten state and local election officials before, during and after Election Day 2026.

In light of this Disclosure, DHS and USCIS must (1) be transparent about what they intend to do with the unreliable records they are generating; (2) immediately stop this initiative and related activities; and (3) remove any TECS or other law enforcement or administrative records generated from it. In addition to taking immediate corrective action, please provide answers to the attached questions no later than September 21, 2026.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,



Alex Padilla
United States Senator
Ranking Member, Committee on
Rules and Administration;
Ranking Member, Judiciary
Subcommittee on Border
Security and Immigration



Charles E. Schumer
United States Senator
Senate Democratic Leader

¹¹ Disclosure Letter, 3; *Appendix*, 18.

¹² Peter Elkind, et. al., *Inside Trump's Failed Hunt for Noncitizen Voters*, *ProPublica* (Aug. 14, 2026), <https://www.propublica.org/article/noncitizen-voting-trump-homeland-security-investigations>; Alvarez, et. al., *Exclusive: DHS plans to launch voter fraud investigation surge Tuesday*, *CNN* (Aug. 31, 2026), <https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/31/politics/homeland-security-voter-fraud-investigations>; Nick Corasaniti & Hamed Aleaziz, *Trump Administration Begins Blitz to Find Elusive Voter Fraud Ahead of Midterms*, *New York Times* (Sept. 2, 2026), <https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/02/us/politics/trump-election-voter-fraud.html>; Ted Hesson, *Immigration Officers Are Being Diverted to Trump's Voter Fraud Effort*, *Washington Post* (Aug. 25, 2026), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2026/08/25/immigration-officers-are-being-diverted-trumps-voter-fraud-effort/>.

cc: Chairman Mitch McConnell, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration
Chairman Chuck Grassley, Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Ranking Member Dick Durbin, Senate Committee on the Judiciary

Questions for DHS and USCIS Regarding the Whistleblower Disclosure from Ranking Member Alex Padilla and Leader Chuck Schumer

- 1) How does DHS or any of its agencies plan to use the information generated by the USCIS “Unlawful Voter Initiative” (USCIS Initiative)? Has DHS or any of its agencies provided any information generated from the USCIS Initiative to HSI, the FBI, or any U.S. Attorneys’ Offices? Has DHS or any of its agencies provided such information to any state or local election office for purposes of determining voter eligibility or does it intend to do so before or after November 3, 2026?
- 2) How many DHS employees, broken down by component agency and title, have been devoted to the USCIS Initiative, HSI “criminal voter fraud surge initiative,” or any other initiative concerning alleged noncitizen voter registration or voting since January 20, 2025?
- 3) What assessment have DHS and USCIS conducted of the operational consequences of these reassignments on other missions, including fraud reviews and national security screenings? What work has DHS and USCIS chosen to pause or forego in order to reassign resources to the “Unlawful Voter Initiative”?
- 4) Which senior DHS or White House officials ordered, approved and oversee each election-related DHS initiative, including the HSI “criminal voter fraud surge initiative” and USCIS FDNS diversion?
- 5) What factual or statistical analyses did DHS conduct to determine that the prevalence of suspected voting by noncitizens warranted the personnel and resources assigned to these efforts? Please provide any analyses and explain how DHS determined that a surge immediately before Election Day 2026 was necessary and appropriate.
- 6) How is DHS obtaining voter data from states which have not voluntarily submitted it to the Department? Which office(s) at DHS headquarters or component agency is responsible for collecting and maintaining these records?
- 7) Provide all legal analysis for the USCIS Initiative, including any analysis of the Department’s legal authority to access information on state voter websites, and specifically the direction for FDNS officers to enter false attestations or access state voter information websites identified for the use of voters or their authorized representatives.
 - a) Did DHS or USCIS notify states that they intended to use these websites for this purpose?
 - b) Does DHS or USCIS keep records of the numbers of false attestations by officers accessing state voter data by claiming to be a voter or their authorized representative?
 - c) Has any officer who has access such websites ever truthfully identified themselves, and if so, under what circumstances?
- 8) Which federal, state or nongovernmental databases or other information sources are DHS employees using or accessing to identify, verify, or check for noncitizens on state voter rolls?

- 9) Did DHS or USCIS analyze whether any new or modified SORN, “routine use” justification, Privacy Impact Assessment, computer-matching/information sharing agreement, or other public notice or agreements were required before beginning these operations?
 - a. Identify every Privacy Threshold Analysis, SORN, “routine use” justification, Privacy Impact Assessment, memorandum of understanding or agreement, data-use/information sharing agreement, legal opinion, Privacy Office review, state law or any other legal or compliance document applicable to these activities and explain how the Department has ensured compliance. Please provide a copy of each of the above that were completed for the USCIS Initiative, the HSI “criminal voter fraud surge initiative,” or any other initiative concerning alleged noncitizen voter registration or voting since January 20, 2025.
 - b. If this disclosure of information was determined to be “routine use” as defined at 5 U.S.C. §552a(a)(7), please provide the reasoning that informed this conclusion. If not, please provide the basis under 5 U.S.C. §552a or any other federal privacy law that DHS and USCIS are subject to that justified the disclosure of this information and the reasoning that informed that justification.
- 10) What does the Department and USCIS mean in its use of the term “supplemental magic” in the training provided to FDNS officers? Please define the term and provide information about where the data FDNS staff were given to further their research originated from.
 - a. How did the Department create its list of individuals to be investigated?
 - b. What factors were considered when determining whether an individual merited review by USCIS?
 - c. How many individuals were referred to USCIS for review under the USCIS Initiative?
 - d. How many individuals have been reviewed by FDNS? How many individuals had TECS records created?
- 11) What training did DHS employees receive before initiating these voter efforts, including training concerning legal guardrails and limitations of DHS databases, state voter registration systems and the applicable restrictions on their use? Please provide a full copy of any training and guidance materials provided to officers and their supervisors on August 21, 2026, and any subsequent materials provided since the start of the USCIS Initiative.
- 12) What recourse do naturalized citizens and other noncitizens reviewed under this USCIS Initiative have to address an erroneous TECS record?
- 13) Please preserve and provide all guidance, policies, training materials, training videos, presentations, manuals, and other records regarding the USCIS “Unlawful Voter Initiative,” the HSI “criminal voter fraud surge initiative,” and related DHS activities to identify noncitizen voters on state voter rolls.



September 8, 2026

The Honorable Alex Padilla
Ranking Member, Committee on Rules and Administration
U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration
331 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C., 20510

**Re: Systemic Pattern of Potential Illegal Conduct and Data Falsification at DHS's
"Unlawful Voter Initiative" — Anonymous Whistleblower Disclosure**

Senator Padilla:

Democracy Defenders Fund represents an anonymous federal whistleblower (hereinafter "Whistleblower" or "client") with direct knowledge of potential repeated illegality in connection with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services-Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate Headquarters (USCIS-FDNS HQ) Unlawful Voter Initiative. The Whistleblower has reason to believe that, with the knowledge and at the direction of leadership at headquarters, the Unlawful Voter Initiative has potentially already committed thousands of violations of state law in an effort to improperly access individuals' voter records. The Whistleblower is similarly aware of detailed evidence of pressure to falsify federal records and believes that may have occurred on a large scale, potentially in violation of federal law. The details supporting our client's reports are set forth in the Appendix to this letter.

Our client reports that leadership of the Unlawful Voter Initiative are requiring DHS employees to utilize Personally Identifiable Information (PII), accessed through DHS internal data, to access state voter registration websites. The employees may be required to use the PII to make false attestations that they are the voter or are acting with the voter's express authorization, in order to access these individual voters' records. Such false representations would likely violate relevant state law. *See, e.g.,* Va. Code § 18.2-152.3. DHS has previously tried to obtain the unredacted voter files of nearly every State. *See* Nick Corasaniti & Alan Feuer, *Justice Department Issues Subpoenas for Voter Data in Nevada*, N.Y. Times (Sept. 4, 2026), <https://tinyurl.com/yhdsjsn6>. Because those demands violate the statutory and constitutional election framework, Democratic and Republican election officials have refused to comply. In response, DOJ has filed at least 31 lawsuits against those states and the District of Columbia to obtain the voter data. Melissa Quinn, *The Trump Administration has filed 31 lawsuits seeking states' voter data. Here's where they stand.*, CBS News (Aug. 17, 2026), <https://tinyurl.com/3rvna3ut>. DOJ has not been successful in a single case so far. The DHS Initiative appears to be an illegal alternative to DOJ's unlawful efforts.

The Whistleblower reports that given the nature of the Initiative, the pressures put on officers, and the instructions given by headquarters, it is likely the case that no officer who has sought to access information on a state website has been truthful about his or her identity. The Unlawful Voter Initiative includes all 50 states and is targeted at up to hundreds of thousands of individuals. The officers received their first and only training on Friday, August 21, and were considered ready to begin the Initiative on Tuesday, August 25. They are required to review and determine if the PII belongs to an “unlawful voter,” and each officer was given a quota of at least five subjects to be reviewed per hour and 40 subjects per day, with USCIS-FDNS-HQ leadership tracking their output—giving officers only twelve minutes to determine if a subject is a U.S. citizen, if they should be considered an “unlawful voter,” and enter a record against them (called a “TECS” record).¹ The Whistleblower understands that the goal is to complete this stage of the initiative by September 12.

When the Whistleblower and others expressed concerns about the legality of this conduct to USCIS-FDNS HQ, the response was that individual officers would not be personally liable for conducting the searches when they are done as part of their official duties and properly documented. No explanation was offered as to why officers would not be legally liable. That statement implies awareness that the activity is illegal and nevertheless requires DHS officials to continue improperly accessing state voter records. Only one substantive response was provided to the concerns raised by the Whistleblower and others, namely that these searches are permissible as open-source research for “adjudicative or investigative” purposes. However, that appears inconsistent with the guidance listed in DHS’s Rules of Behavior required for accessing other, less sensitive information, such as social media posts; and also the USCIS Rules of Behavior, in which employees agree that they “will not attempt to access systems [they are] not authorized to access” and “will not attempt to bypass access control measures.” No attempt was made to explain these discrepancies, leading the Whistleblower and others to believe that DHS leadership may be knowingly requiring them to break the law and DHS policies.

Furthermore, the Whistleblower reports widespread doubts among officers working on the Initiative about the accuracy of the source data DHS is providing to its employees, through USCIS-FDNS HQ, as part of the Unlawful Voter Initiative. The data DHS provides often consists of unverified voter registration and/or voting dates and is known to conflict with data found in other sources. Indeed, the inaccuracies of this DHS data are widely known and acknowledged by DHS itself. The State Citizenship Lists DHS is putting together, pursuant to the President’s Executive Order No. 14399, *Ensuring Citizenship Verification and Integrity in*

¹ “TECS” is officially an acronym with no definition. It originally stood for Treasury Enforcement Communication System. <https://www.aila.org/library/cbp-memo-muster-on-tecs-name-change>.



Federal Elections, 91 Fed. Reg. 17125 (Mar. 31, 2026), must be compiled from “citizenship and naturalization records, SSA records, SAVE data, and other relevant Federal databases.” 2026 Elections EO, § 2(a). Yet both SSA and DHS have both acknowledged systematic data gaps and unreliability in the underlying data set for purposes with respect to determining voter eligibility and citizenship. *See e.g.*, Letter from Nancy Morales Gonzalez, Assoc. Gen. Couns., SSA, to Jon Sherman, Litig. Dir. & Senior Couns., Fair Elections Ctr., Re: Application for Records and Testimony of a Social Security Administration (SSA) Employee in a Federal Civil Case 2 (Jul. 13, 2023), <https://perma.cc/KS2N-U2US>.²

Moreover, the internal data often does not include the sources of the information, and USCIS-FDNS HQ does not and will not elaborate on the specific sources and dates of data it provides to the officers conducting reviews. When officers expressed their misgivings about the unreliability of the data to leadership, they were told they were required to create the TECS law enforcement records of unlawful registration and/or voting irrespective of their concerns. Although the training acknowledges that the voter data set contains inconsistent information, officers were told to assume that the data provided by DHS to USCIS-FDNS HQ was accurate enough to determine whether an individual may have voted or registered to vote by a specific date.

At one point in the training video, there was an express recognition of these flaws. The video tells DHS employees that certain information that is not included in the source data will be “brought in through supplemental magic.” Magic is not a recognized form of record keeping under state or federal law.

As a result, our client reports that TECS law enforcement records are regularly created against individuals based solely on DHS data that is unverified, inconsistent with other information, and/or is unexplained to the officers working on the Initiative. Our client also reports that TECS law enforcement records have been created against U.S. citizens. Such records can have ramifications for individuals far beyond the voting context. TECS law enforcement records can be used against them in *any* interaction they may have with the federal government, such as crossing the border during travel or seeking a benefit.

² *See also* DHS, Privacy Threshold Analysis for the SAVE Program 17, 34, 38–39 (approved Jul. 17, 2025), <https://perma.cc/9AXY-WCLU> (DHS knew that there were “shortfalls in data accuracy” for SAVE, and warned that SAVE “may share inaccurate information with registered agencies”); DHS, DHS Ref. No. DHS/USCIS/PIA-006(d), Privacy Impact Assessment for the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements “SAVE” Program 19 (Oct. 31, 2025), <https://perma.cc/G92U-LYPM>; USCIS, Voter Registration and Voter List Maintenance Fact Sheet (Aug. 27, 2025), <https://perma.cc/Q5F7-YBCA> (“if an individual with acquired citizenship has not received a Certificate of Citizenship from USCIS (e.g., some foreign-born children of U.S. citizens) or is not designated as a U.S. citizen in SSA records, SAVE may not be able to confirm that individual’s U.S. citizenship”).



Our client wants it known that they believe the responsibility for this potentially illegal activity lies solely with USCIS-FDNS HQ. The Whistleblower believes that their colleagues below that level, up to and including regional leadership, are likely also victims of an abuse of power. Our client wants it known that they would not have had the courage to come forward if not for them speaking up internally, many before our client did. They are outstanding public servants and do not deserve to be vilified for being placed in an impossible situation by headquarters.

Our client, a lawful anonymous whistleblower, feels it is their duty to come forward and reveal potentially unlawful conduct related to the "Unlawful Voter Initiative." Our client is understandably extremely concerned about retaliation by Administration officials should their identity become known. As such, we ask that reasonable steps be taken to maintain their anonymity throughout the whistleblowing process. The Whistleblower makes this disclosure out of concern that law enforcement records used against individuals, including U.S. citizens, are being created through potentially unlawful means and based upon unreliable information. That is a dangerous abuse of the power of the federal government. We respectfully submit this disclosure for inquiry and investigation. Our client welcomes referral of the matter to any other oversight bodies with relevant authority and jurisdiction.

Sincerely,

/s/ Norman L. Eisen

Norman L. Eisen

Executive Chair

Democracy Defenders Fund

[Redacted signature block]

/s/ Stephen A. Jonas

Stephen A. Jonas

Chief Counsel & Director, Rapid Response Legal

Democracy Defenders Fund

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Appendix — Anonymous Whistleblower Disclosure

This document reflects the Whistleblower’s personal knowledge and assessment. Given the size of the Initiative and the speed being demanded of officials, USCIS-FDNS HQ has put extraordinary pressure on employees despite the legal risk involved. Our client has an extreme fear of retaliation, but they feel an obligation to speak up about the misconduct and gross mismanagement they have witnessed.

1. “UNLAWFUL VOTER INITIATIVE”

On Friday, 08/21/2026, FDNS IOs received instructions to stop everything being worked on and immediately watch a 1 hour 45 minute training video provided by USCIS-FDNS HQ. The video, referenced throughout this statement, is the only formal training provided by USCIS-FDNS HQ for the Unlawful Voter Initiative surge. It was also the first time officers may have heard of the Initiative that they would be mandatorily assigned, to effective immediately. USCIS-FDNS HQ also provided a link to an internal FDNS website listing all 50 states and provided links to each state’s official state voter registration website, along with some other guides, links, and a PowerPoint presentation.

Three days later, on 8/24/2026, FDNS completed a reorganization that brought IOs throughout the country under more direct control of headquarters. The Unlawful Voter Initiative appears to be the very first action taken by headquarters using the newly reorganized FDNS.

By Tuesday, 8/25/2026, officers were considered trained and ready to begin reviewing data provided by DHS to the officers through USCIS-FDNS HQ. This data contains the personal information of tens or hundreds of thousands of individuals throughout all 50 states, including US citizens. Officers are supposed to review and determine if the information belongs to an “unlawful voter” and were given a quota of at least five subjects to be reviewed per hour. If the officer determines the subject to be an unlawful voter, they are to create a TECS record against them so that they may be subjected to additional scrutiny. Our client understands that the goal is to complete this stage of the Initiative by 9/12/2026.

Details: Evidence supporting this statement is provided below. This is not all of the evidence that exists, but it is what the Whistleblower feels can be provided at this time without revealing their identity. Much of the evidence discussed in this statement is sourced to the mandatory training video, along with a transcript that was provided with the video. The creation of the transcript appears to have been automated and there are minor transcription errors with some words, but the transcript accurately reflects what was said in the training video. We have only redacted information that could potentially be used to identify an individual officer as there is extreme fear within FDNS of retaliation for discussing this activity. We are only including details from the transcript that we believe to be indicative of violations of law, gross

mismanagement, and/or abuse of authority.

2. ACCESSING STATE VOTER REGISTRATION WEBSITES USING DECEPTIVE INFORMATION

Image 1 shows the mandatory training video provided by USCIS-FDNS HQ, with the URL in the bottom left of the screenshot being the link to the internal FDNS website for this initiative. The transcript for the training video was provided on the right side of the screen with timestamps for the video—which will be referenced throughout this statement:




Image 1 – FDNS Unlawful Voter Surge Training Video

Training Video Transcript:

14:00

But the part that I really want to emphasize for purposes of this surge, it's a lot, but there's information in a table at the bottom part of this sight and it go, it lists every single state available.

14:14

So we have in the column on the far left is obviously the state.

14:22

The next is that link in the state.

14:26

It's a hyperlink to go to their state voter registration or voter site.

Image 2 (below) shows the main page for the Initiative that was referenced in the video. The first state voter registration website that is linked to (Alabama) is shown at the bottom of the screenshot and is also used as an example in the training video (Image 3 and Image 4).




Image 2 - FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website with Link to Alabama State Voter Registration Website




Image 3 - FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website Visible in Training Video (Alabama)

Training Video Transcript:

14:56

So I have Alabama up on the screen.

14:58

If you are assigned to cases, Alabama cases, and you want to search their state registration site, you would need the first name, the last name, and the date of birth of the person as it was entered at their registration.





Image 4 – Alabama Voter Registration Website Linked from FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website


As can be seen from both the transcript of the training video and the screenshot of the Alabama Voter Registration website, in order to access the voter information and obtain the voter’s information as instructed by the training, an officer must input the name and DOB of the voter as if it were that voter (“confirm *your* registration status....”).

Images 5 and 6 (below) show the link to Virginia on the FDNS initiative website. The fact that an attestation is required for Virginia and some other states is highlighted on the FDNS initiative website with (“Attestation”). The link to Virginia’s Department of Elections website is visible in the bottom left corner from moving the on-screen cursor over the “Virginia” hyperlink.



State	First Name	Last Name	Date of Birth	Sex	SSN	Locality	Attestation
Virginia (VA)	First Name	Last Name	Date of Birth	Sex	SSN	Locality	Attestation
Virginia (VA)	First Name	Last Name	Date of Birth	Sex	SSN	Locality	Attestation
Virginia (VA)	First Name	Last Name	Date of Birth	Sex	SSN	Locality	Attestation

Image 5 - FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website Showing Virginia with “(Attestation)” Highlighted



State	First Name	Last Name	Date of Birth	Sex	SSN	Locality	Attestation
Virginia (VA)	First Name	Last Name	Date of Birth	Sex	SSN	Locality	Attestation

Image 6 - Close-Up of Virginia State Voter Registration Website Link with “(Attestation)” Highlighted

Image 7 (below) shows the Virginia Department of Elections website linked on the FDNS initiative website. Note that in order to conduct a search on this site, the officer is required to make an attestation certifying and affirming that they are the voter or acting with their express authorization. It also makes clear that it is unlawful to access the information of any other voter.

The screenshot shows the Virginia Department of Elections website. At the top, there is a header with the Virginia state seal and the text "DEPARTMENT of ELECTIONS". Below this, a section titled "WHAT YOU CAN DO AS A REGISTERED VOTER USING THIS PORTAL" lists several actions: "Update your address", "Apply to Vote Absentee by Mail", "Join the permanent absentee list", "Find your polling place", and "Check your voting history". Below this list, there is a login section titled "To log in, please fill out the following" with fields for "First name*", "Last name*", "Date of birth*" (with a date picker), and "Last 4 of SSN*". There is also a "Locality*" dropdown menu. Below the login fields, there is a checkbox for the attestation: "I certify and affirm that the information provided to access my voter registration is my own or I am expressly authorized by the voter to access this information. I understand that it is unlawful to access the record of any other voter, punishable as computer fraud under Va. Code § 18.2-152.3." At the bottom of the form, there are two buttons: "Previous" and "Submit".

Image 7 – Virginia State Voter Registration Website Linked from FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website.

What follows is the full text of attestation on Virginia website:


“I certify and affirm that the information provided to access my voter registration is my own or I am expressly authorized by the voter to access this information. I understand that it is unlawful to access the record of any other voter, punishable as computer fraud under Va. Code § 18.2-152.3.”

The two other states in the Initiative internal website with highlighted attestation requirements are Florida and Massachusetts (Image 8, Image 9, Image 10, and Image 11 below).



Contract ID	First Name Last Name Date of Birth Driver's License or State ID #	Address No Phone # No Registration Date No Election Date No Email No	Account/DOB
State PI	First Name Last Name Date of Birth Attestation	Data Source(s) (S) First Name No Middle Name No Last Name No Date of Birth No Year of Birth No Country of Birth No AK No SSN No Address No Phone # No Registration Date No Election Date No Email No	Account/DOB
State (S)	First Name Last Name County Date of Birth	Data Source(s) (S) First Name No Middle Name No Last Name No Date of Birth No Year of Birth No Country of Birth No AK No SSN No Address No Phone # No Registration Date No Election Date No Email No	Account/DOB

Image 8 – FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website Showing Florida with “(Attestation)” Highlighted.



FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF STATE Corporations | Cultural Affairs | Elections | Historical Resources | Library and Information Services

Voter Information Lookup

Version en Español This site requires JavaScript to be enabled.

CHECK YOUR REGISTRATION AND VOTING STATUS

Check here for your voter registration status. To find your polling place, sample ballot, and vote-by-mail ballot status, check your Supervisor of Elections' website.

A supervisor of elections' office must process a voter registration application no later than 13 days after receipt, (s. 97.053(7), F.S.). It may take an additional 1-2 business days thereafter for the information to be available online.

ONLINE VOTER REGISTRATION

Visit RegisterToVoteFlorida.gov to submit a new registration or to update your existing record.

RegisterToVoteFlorida.gov

Your name and date of birth must be entered as it appears in your registration record to find your information. (*) Indicates required field.

* First Name :

* Last Name :

* Birth Date (MM/DD/YYYY) :

This website is intended for use by a registered voter to determine his or her voter registration and voting status. It is unlawful to knowingly alter another person's voter registration information or to attempt, assist with, or otherwise commit fraud in connection with the right to vote. See §§ 104.011, 104.041, and 104.41, Fla. Stat. For more information, visit our [Voter Registration information webpage](#).

☐ I understand and agree.

Close your browser when done with your search.

Image 9 - Florida State Voter Registration Website Linked from FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website

The website makes clear that “This website is intended for use by a registered voter to determine his or her voter registration and voting status.”

State (MS)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	State (MS)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	State (MS)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Alabama (AL)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Alabama (AL)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Alabama (AL)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Alaska (AK)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Alaska (AK)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Alaska (AK)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Arizona (AZ)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Arizona (AZ)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Arizona (AZ)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Arkansas (AR)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Arkansas (AR)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Arkansas (AR)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
California (CA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	California (CA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	California (CA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Colorado (CO)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Colorado (CO)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Colorado (CO)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Connecticut (CT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Connecticut (CT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Connecticut (CT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Delaware (DE)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Delaware (DE)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Delaware (DE)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Florida (FL)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Florida (FL)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Florida (FL)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Georgia (GA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Georgia (GA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Georgia (GA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Hawaii (HI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Hawaii (HI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Hawaii (HI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Idaho (ID)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Idaho (ID)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Idaho (ID)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Illinois (IL)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Illinois (IL)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Illinois (IL)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Indiana (IN)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Indiana (IN)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Indiana (IN)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Iowa (IA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Iowa (IA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Iowa (IA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Kansas (KS)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Kansas (KS)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Kansas (KS)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Kentucky (KY)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Kentucky (KY)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Kentucky (KY)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Louisiana (LA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Louisiana (LA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Louisiana (LA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Maine (ME)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Maine (ME)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Maine (ME)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Maryland (MD)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Maryland (MD)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Maryland (MD)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Massachusetts (MA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Massachusetts (MA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Massachusetts (MA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Michigan (MI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Michigan (MI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Michigan (MI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Minnesota (MN)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Minnesota (MN)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Minnesota (MN)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Mississippi (MS)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Mississippi (MS)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Mississippi (MS)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Missouri (MO)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Missouri (MO)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Missouri (MO)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Montana (MT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Montana (MT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Montana (MT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Nebraska (NE)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Nebraska (NE)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Nebraska (NE)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Nevada (NV)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Nevada (NV)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Nevada (NV)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
New Hampshire (NH)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	New Hampshire (NH)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	New Hampshire (NH)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
New Jersey (NJ)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	New Jersey (NJ)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	New Jersey (NJ)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
New Mexico (NM)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	New Mexico (NM)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	New Mexico (NM)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
New York (NY)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	New York (NY)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	New York (NY)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
North Carolina (NC)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	North Carolina (NC)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	North Carolina (NC)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
North Dakota (ND)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	North Dakota (ND)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	North Dakota (ND)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Ohio (OH)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Ohio (OH)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Ohio (OH)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Oklahoma (OK)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Oklahoma (OK)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Oklahoma (OK)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Oregon (OR)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Oregon (OR)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Oregon (OR)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Pennsylvania (PA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Pennsylvania (PA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Pennsylvania (PA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Rhode Island (RI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Rhode Island (RI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Rhode Island (RI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
South Carolina (SC)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	South Carolina (SC)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	South Carolina (SC)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
South Dakota (SD)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	South Dakota (SD)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	South Dakota (SD)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Tennessee (TN)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Tennessee (TN)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Tennessee (TN)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Texas (TX)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Texas (TX)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Texas (TX)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Utah (UT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Utah (UT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Utah (UT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Vermont (VT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Vermont (VT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Vermont (VT)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Virginia (VA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Virginia (VA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Virginia (VA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Washington (WA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Washington (WA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Washington (WA)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
West Virginia (WV)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	West Virginia (WV)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	West Virginia (WV)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Wisconsin (WI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Wisconsin (WI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Wisconsin (WI)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth
Wyoming (WY)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Wyoming (WY)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth	Wyoming (WY)	First Name Last Name Date of Birth

Image 10 - FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website Showing Massachusetts with “(Attestation)” Highlighted

Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
William Francis Galvin

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Find my voter registration status

To find your voter registration information:

- Enter your name, date of birth, and the zip code at which you are qualified to vote.
- Required fields are marked with an asterisk (*).

* Enter your name
First Name: Last Name:

* Enter Your Date of Birth
Month: Day: Year:

* Enter the 5-digit Zip code of your residential address
Zip code:

This webpage is intended for use by the individual voter to determine their voter registration status.

☐ I understand and agree to the statement above.

Clear fields Search

Image 11 - Massachusetts Voter Registration Website Linked from FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website

The website states that “This webpage is intended for use by the individual voter to determine their voter registration status.”

While other states may not have an explicit attestation requirement, the wording and nature of their websites make it clear that their use is intended for the registered voter only. California is another example.



Image 12 - FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website Showing Link to California State Voter Registration Website




Image 13 - California State Voter Registration Website Linked from FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website

As stated on the website: “To find your record, you will need to enter some personal information. Close your browser when you are done to protect your personal information.” It goes on to say: “In order to find an exact match, your voter registration record must have either a California driver license or identification card (DL/ID) number, or the last four digits of your social security number. For best results, please enter both your DL/ID and last four digits of your social security number.”

In light of these instructions about access to the state websites, officers expressed concerns that accessing registered voter information on these websites may be illegal as officers are essentially misrepresenting themselves as the potential registered voter (with or without a specific attestation).

There is a statement on the FDNS initiative website that “OCC advises that it is permissible for Immigration Services Officers and Immigration Officers to use these state voter websites for purposes of confirming voter registration status as it pertains to an alien’s eligibility for an immigration benefit.” A similar statement is also found in the PowerPoint presentation provided for this initiative (Image 14 below).




Image 14 - FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative PowerPoint Presentation Slide 12

However, this broad statement appears to conflict with the state law cited in the Virginia state voter registration site's attestation and likely other state laws requiring truthful information when accessing the state's websites. Moreover, it does not clarify the legal authority used to access state voter registration websites despite this clear and obvious conflict.

As noted, not all state websites call for attestations or possibly even identification as a voter to access information. But because of the nature and pressures put on officers participating in the Initiative and the instructions given by USCIS-FDNS HQ, it is likely the case that no officer who has sought to access information on a state website has been truthful about his or her identity.

The training video said that OCC "advised that it is perfectly OK for IS OS, for adjudicators and for FDNSIOS to use those websites [the "state websites on the ECN site"] to search records," and provided the links to those sites. (41:53).

Despite this conclusory statement in the training video, requests were made in the last week of August to leadership for details on the legal justification and authority for seemingly violating state law and making false attestations. The response was twofold:

- OCC advised that this type of review is permissible as open-source research when conducted for purposes related to adjudicative or investigative responsibilities.

- IOs and Immigration Services Officers (ISOs) are not personally liable for conducting these searches when done as part of their official duties and properly documented.

Notably, the statement “IOs and ISOs are not personally liable for conducting these searches when done as part of their official duties and properly documented” does not provide adequate legal justification or any authority for conducting these searches. Part of an officer’s basic training includes a detailed overview of the legal basis for their authority, so it is not at all improper for an officer to ask for the specific laws that they are relying on to exercise it. However, this statement suggests that there may be legal implications for accessing these websites, but that the officers themselves are simply not personally liable. This leads us to believe that USCIS-FDNS HQ is aware that the activity may be illegal, and yet they are still requiring officers to engage in this illegal activity with promises of personal liability protection.

Stating that these searches are permissible as open-source research for “adjudicative or investigative” purposes relating to voting is a change from the earlier justification that the searches pertain to “an alien’s eligibility for an immigration benefit.”

This also appears to be inconsistent with USCIS and DHS guidance. The USCIS Rules of Behavior (which uses the same language as found in “Information Technology System Security Program, Sensitive Systems Attachment G Rules of Behavior”) states that every USCIS employee must acknowledge and abide by a System Access section that specifically says, “I will not attempt to access systems I am not authorized to access.” The next section (Passwords and Other Access Control Measures) specifies “I will not attempt to bypass access control measures.” Accessing those state websites is therefore a fundamental violation of the most basic rules of behavior that all employees must acknowledge.

Furthermore, it is also inconsistent with the DHS Rules of Behavior required for accessing other, less sensitive information such as social media posts. For example, page 8 of the publicly available Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media Instruction 110-01-001 states that employees should “Respect individuals’ privacy settings and access only information that is publicly available unless the individual whose information the employee seeks to access has given consent to access it.” It is inexplicable for private social media information to be afforded more protection than an individual’s voter registration information and voting record, especially when sensitive PII is necessary to access the voter information without the individual’s knowledge or consent and with the officer falsely attesting to be the registered voter.

3. SOURCE, ACCURACY, AND SCOPE OF PII DATA PROVIDED BY DHS TO USCIS-FDNS HQ

There are multiple steps to the Unlawful Voter Initiative: 1) verifying that the data provided by DHS to USCIS-FDNS-HQ matches USCIS holdings; 2) making a determination as to whether or not the identified individual is a U.S. citizen and voted/registered to vote (“lawfully” or “unlawfully” based on when their U.S. citizenship was acquired); and 3) creating a record in TECS to alert any government agency with access to TECS (including HSI) that the subject was identified as a potential unlawful voter.

Training Video Transcript:


0:38

In a nutshell, you're going to review information, specifically voter data and determine if it is a match to USCIS subject data, USCIS holdings, and ultimately if it is, is that person an unlawful voter or not?

—

1:07

And then ultimately for unlawful voters, you will be creating a TECS record.



THE PROCESS

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

3. Compare the data provided by the source component to the supplemented DHS system data in your assignment spreadsheet and conduct systems searches to determine:

If Yes:

Is the voter a U.S. citizen? Select Y or N .

A. If Yes and U.S. citizenship was acquired **PRIOR** to registering to vote or voting, enter Comments in "Comments" to support your review and results. All other columns may be left blank.

B. If No, or if U.S. citizenship was acquired **AFTER** to registering to vote or voting:

- Enter the voter's primary A number in "PrimaryANumberFound"
- Enter the voter's current immigration status in "Current Status"
- Enter the voter's current residential address in "Current Address"
- Enter the voter's Registration Date in "RegistrationDateFound." This may be found in the provided data.
- Did the person vote? Enter Y or N in "Voted."
- If Y, enter the voter's earliest election in "VotedDate"
- If the subject is an unlawful voter and a TECS Record was created, enter the record number in "TECSRecordNumber." See **TECS Records** for further guidance.

Enter Comments in "Comments" to support your review and results.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)

Image 15 - FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative PowerPoint Presentation Slide 8

There are, however, widely known problems with the accuracy of the data provided by DHS to USCIS-FDNS HQ, which manifest in the second and third steps described above. As already documented earlier in this statement, officers are being directed to verify voter registration dates

and voting dates provided by DHS using state voter registration websites. Aside from the legal issues already discussed, officers have noted that sometimes the information provided by DHS to USCIS-FDNS HQ contradicts results from the state voter registration websites; a state voter registration website may show that there is no match to an individual, while the data provided to officers by USCIS-FDNS HQ lists specific voter registration dates and a date on which the subject may have first voted. With such a direct contradiction, knowing the specific source and date of the information is necessary to determine reliability before taking any action.

USCIS-FDNS HQ does not and will not elaborate on the specific sources and dates of data it provides to the officers conducting the review. In the training video and when directly questioned, generalized or canned statements are provided. The problem is further compounded by the fact that explicit instructions were given that the data provided by DHS to USCIS-FDNS HQ should be assumed to be accurate enough to determine that an individual may have voted or registered to vote by a specific date. Yet the training repeatedly points to the inconsistencies in the data, noting that sometimes the voter registration date is provided in the initial data set and sometimes it is not.

Training Video Transcript:

7:15

You might also not have a registration date, but you would find that through other other research and we'll go over some of that in in just a minute.

The training leaves it up to the officer to check whether the person may have voted, again acknowledging that the data is inconsistent:

7:50

So based on what you have available and information you find, did they vote yes or no?

7:55

And if they did vote, you want to enter the earliest election date in the next field.

8:02

Again, this might be a data point provided to you from the source data, and in some cases it might not be.

8:10

You might have only a registration date provided in the source data.

8:15

And when you go on to do some additional research, for example, looking up the subject in a state voter website, you might find an election in addition to a registration date provided in the data.

8:33

Or vice versa, we might get an election date.

The training acknowledges that there is a confusing collection of data from many different sources as well as differences across the states. The training video compares Connecticut to Illinois, as an example. While Connecticut's records provide both the voter's registration date and their earliest election date, Illinois provides only the voter registration date and no election date whatsoever. (16:25-17:20).

The training video transcript then states that the information is coming from multiple sources, and acknowledges incongruities between the systems and the states, and between the states themselves:

17:43

So accurate [*sic*: "Accurint" - see below] and clear [see below] both have voter records available.

17:47

Some states are in both systems, some states are in one or the other, some states are in neither.

17:53

So just know that in addition to the data points provided with your assignment, you also will have an opportunity to look up voter records in accurate and clear.

18:03

I would say if like here for Arizona, Arizona isn't in accurate or clear.

18:10

So you probably don't have to waste your time even looking because it's just not a record that is there at this time.

(Note that "accurate" refers to the commercial database Accurint, with the pronunciation similar enough to cause an error in the likely-automated transcription. "Clear" refers to the commercial database Thomson Reuters CLEAR.)

In some states, the only source for voter registration dates or voting dates besides the state voter registration website is DHS data. This is plainly visible on the internal Unlawful Voter Initiative website, with the rightmost column indicating where state voter registration data may also be found besides the state voter registration website (e.g., commercial databases like Accurint or Clear). For example, the training video states that the Social Security number included in the aforementioned Connecticut data comes from Accurint. (16:12). In the case of California, however, there is no such other source (Image 16 and Image 17):

State	Required to Search Info (This information is available to DHS only and is not available to the public)	Data Provided to FDNS	Available Data Sources (This information is available to the public and is not available to the public)
Alabama (AL)	First Name; Last Name; Date of Birth	- First Name: Yes - Middle Name: Yes - Last Name: Yes - Date of Birth: Yes - Year of Birth: Yes - Country of Birth: Yes - AP: Yes - SSN: No - SSN: No from source: Yes from Account - Address: Yes - Phone #: Yes - Registration Date: Yes - Election Date: Yes (all elections) - Email: Yes	Source: CAIR
Arizona (AZ)	First Name; Last Name; Date of Birth	- First Name: Yes - Middle Name: Yes - Last Name: Yes - Date of Birth: Yes - Year of Birth: Yes - Country of Birth: Yes - AP: Yes - SSN: No - SSN: No from source: Yes from Account - Address: Yes - Phone #: Yes - Registration Date: Yes - Election Date: Yes (all elections) - Email: Yes	Source: CAIR
California (CA)	First Name; Last Name; Date of Birth	- First Name: Yes - Middle Name: Yes - Last Name: Yes - Date of Birth: Yes - Year of Birth: Yes - Country of Birth: Yes - AP: Yes - SSN: No - SSN: No from source: Yes from Account - Address: Yes - Phone #: Yes - Registration Date: Yes - Election Date: Yes (all elections) - Email: Yes	Source: CAIR
Colorado (CO)	First Name; Last Name; Date of Birth	- First Name: Yes - Middle Name: Yes - Last Name: Yes - Date of Birth: Yes - Year of Birth: Yes - Country of Birth: Yes - AP: Yes - SSN: No - SSN: No from source: Yes from Account - Address: Yes - Phone #: Yes - Registration Date: Yes - Election Date: Yes (all elections) - Email: Yes	Source: CAIR

Image 16 – FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative Internal Website Showing Column Headers, Available Data Sources

California (CA)	First Name; Last Name; Date of Birth; California Driver's License/Identification Card or Last 4 of SSN	- Data Source(s): DHS - First Name: Yes - Middle Name: Yes - Last Name: Yes - Date of Birth: Yes - Year of Birth: No - Country of Birth: Yes - AP: No - SSN: No from source: Yes from Account - Address: Yes - Phone #: Yes - Registration Date: Yes - Election Date: Yes (all elections) - Email: Yes	
-----------------	--	---	--

Image 17 - Close-up of California State Voter Registration Website Link

For California, there is no way to verify the voter registration dates or voting dates in the data provided by DHS without accessing the California state voter registration website, which may not be legal and has been stated by officers to often be inaccessible due to technical errors. Officers are specifically told to rely on the data DHS provided for California and use the voter registration dates and voting dates provided in that data to indicate that the subject may be an unlawful voter and create a TECS record. Throughout the training video, officers are told to do their own research and make their own determinations as to whether an individual may have unlawfully voted or registered to vote. In practice, the officers' determinations must hold the DHS-provided voter registration dates and voting dates to be accurate despite any reasonable concerns or evidence to the contrary.

Training Video Transcript:

18:28

I just want to, I want to really stress how important the source data is.

18:32

So like [REDACTED] mentioning in the third column, the data provided to FDNS.

18:36

So the data sources, it has IRIS.

18:38

If it says IRIS, that means it was received via save.

18:42

If it says DOJ DHS or is there an ICE, [REDACTED], that might be an ICE too.

18:47

All of those values, that's just the, that's just the agency that passed us the public voter file.

18:54

So these are all still public voter files.

18:56

The data source.

18:56

It doesn't mean that the initial source was DHS.

18:58

It means that that's how we received the file.

19:00

So, this public voter file for California was passed to us by the department.

19:05

So like that's how we received it.

—

21:56

To illustrate the point, this will be populated with 10s of thousands of actual cases in the very near future.

22:06

And this is what you will access.

22:09

So this is what it will look like.

22:12

And for those of you who just click on the link, there's just going to be 10s of thousands of records here.

—

26:29

All of these things come in the source data if it's available, if it's blank, you know, or if the ECN site says for example the date of birth did was not something provided and you see a date of birth here, then that is possible that was brought in as a supplemental effort through FDNS enhancements.

26:52

So if the ECN site says no date of birth and you see a date of birth that did not come from the source data, that would be applicable to any of these fields that could potentially come in the source data.

27:07

So the reason we have it broken up here, we have a full date of birth and then we have a month and year, and we have a year of birth is because some states provide only a year of birth.

27:18

It'll be a first name, middle name, a last name, and a year of birth only.

27:23

So that's why you'll see so many variations of the date of birth.

27:29

The voter address, some states do provide a voter address that they entered at the time of registration.

—

29:20

We do not get A numbers in source data not so we that is something that's going to be brought in through *supplemental magic*. (emphasis added).

There may be no better description of the DHS source data, or at least the lack of visibility afforded to us in how it was compiled, than “supplemental magic.” In the end, this “supplemental magic” is being relied upon to enter TECS records against people, including U.S. citizens, despite known issues with the source data.

As the Training Video Transcript states:

4:00

Be aware of what is, what information was provided by the source compared to what information you have available, and you're ultimately going to compare those two things and determine is this a subject match?

4:14

Is the voter a match to DHS systems?

—

5:54

We pull in the A number based on USCIS holdings, but in some instances you'll see people have multiple A numbers or for one reason or another, maybe there's an error in the data.

—

8:56

So if the subject, if you determine that the subject is an unlawful voter and you need to

enter a text record, in those instances for all unlawful voters, we're going to be entering text records.

(Note that “text records” in the transcript refer to “TECS records,” with the pronunciation similar enough to cause an error in the likely-automated transcription.)

The Whistleblower emphasized that verifying data provided by DHS through USCIS-FDNS HQ is not an objectionable requirement. If the data for an individual is found to be accurate, lawfully using available systems and resources to determine if an alien did in fact vote or register to vote would also not be an objectionable requirement (at least not rising to the level of abuse of authority and/or gross mismanagement). Creating a TECS record on an individual (which is the responsibility of and attributable to an individual officer) would also not be an objectionable requirement, assuming the officer is reasonably certain that the data upon which the record relies is accurate enough that a TECS record is merited. However, it is clear to our client and other DHS employees that the data they are being forced to rely upon is not reliable.

Officers have expressed concerns about the requirement to enter TECS records that would not otherwise be created without the voter registration date and/or voting dates provided in the DHS source data. When explicitly asked if officers could complete the assignment without creating TECS records that rely solely on the DHS source data for voter registration and/or voting dates, officers were told “no” by FDNS leadership. This will have a significant impact on certain states, e.g. California, where voter registration and voting dates were often provided only in the DHS data because of inaccessibility or inconsistency with the California state voter registration website data and the absence of sources such as Accurant or Clear. The result is that a significant number of TECS records, potentially thousands or tens of thousands, will be created against California residents based on data that an officer may have good reason to believe is unreliable or inaccurate without corroboration.

This requires the officer to create a record in TECS under their own name that they may believe to be inaccurate or false due to reasonable reliability concerns with the DHS data. The Whistleblower, given their extensive experience serving in government, believes this rises to the level of gross mismanagement and abuse of authority by USCIS-FDNS HQ, as many of these records are likely being created by officers based on a fear of reprisal and discipline as opposed to confidence in their assessment of the data. From what our client has directly observed in the completed assignments, it appears more California residents than not that were included in the DHS source data have had TECS records created against them. From what our client has directly observed, multiple officers have specifically noted in their comments that the only accessible source for a voter registration date or voting date was the DHS data. Additional accuracy issues with the source data are also described throughout the video, including regarding US citizens which will be expanded on in the next section.

For example, the training video discussed the implications of multiple alien numbers (“A numbers”) and Social Security numbers associated with a person:

29:32

And then we have if there's multiple [A] numbers, perhaps consolidated a numbers, multiple related to subjects for whatever reason, you see that in the set column, the [A] number set and it just shows the primary versus what is possibly, you know, multiple [A] numbers for the same person that will help you drive your research.

29:55

This social is the next column.

29:57

If that is available in the data, it will be brought in.

30:02

Generally, you will have this provided it is not provided in the source data generally, but it could be, it perhaps will be in the future, but it is *or* brought in from supplemental, you know, from supplementing the data.

30:17

So you'll likely have a value there when you get these cases.

30:22

And I'll just, sorry, I'll just add that [REDACTED] touched on this, but it's very likely that a lot of these assignments will have multiple and alien numbers and multiple Social Security numbers, right?

—

30:49

So there's a lot of different criteria here.

30:50

When there are multiple alien number sets in that next column, there could be multiple alien numbers that both relate to the voter or there could be multiple alien numbers that relate to completely different people.

31:02

And what we do is this is a sign because one of those alien numbers might be a non citizen.

31:07

So it's important to check both alien numbers and see whether they relate back to your voter.

31:11

And the same goes for the social.

31:13

When you're reviewing cases, you will see you you will see a lot of cases that have multiple Social Security numbers as well.

31:19

So, you know, they might not both relate to the same person.

And later in the video, the trainer says:

54:45

Social Security numbers, last thing before we move on, they may not be accurate.

54:50

Do not rely solely on the Social Security information.

4. U.S. CITIZENS

Officers are required to use the PII of confirmed U.S. citizens in order to access state voter registration websites without their knowledge or consent. This is done to find evidence that a naturalized US citizen may have registered to vote or voted prior to naturalization. If the “supplemental magic” associates someone with an alien number, even if it is outdated because that individual has long since become a citizen, and the reviewing officer confirms there is a match between the subject and the alien number in USCIS databases, they will use the known U.S. citizen’s PII in an attempt to find evidence that they registered to vote or voted prior to naturalization. The only way for a U.S. citizen to escape this scrutiny is for the officer to determine that there is not a subject match. It is irrelevant if a subject naturalized decades ago, has no current applications with USCIS, or even if they’re deceased. All that matters is that the DHS source data indicates that they are a subject with an alien number that registered to vote or voted.

As the Training Video Transcript states:

10:19

So we have public voter files that people that voted in these states, that raw data includes a lot of U.S.

10:24

citizens.

10:24

So what we did is we took the voters and we tried to match them up against USCIS holdings.

10:30

And then once we match them up against USCIS holdings, we tried to identify whether that CSUSCIS holding is a current citizen.

10:39

But what I'll say is the two biggest determinations that you're going to make is 1, whether the person is a match, right?

10:45

So whether the voter is a match to the USCIS holding and two, whether that USCIS holding is a current alien or whether they're current USCS holding as a citizen.

19:16

So the two big elements to our review is 1, reviewing to see whether it's a subject match and two, and we'll stress this throughout the presentation.

19:24

And two, reviewing to see whether the person is [a US] citizen.

19:28

If you're reviewing the voter and you determine that the alien number that's brought in through USCIS holdings is not a subject match to the voter, then you are not, you know, you, you won't be reviewing citizenship, you'll be focusing on just the subject match.

19:56

So, you know, review the, the, the, the information you're reviewing is the voter source data and not the USCS holdings that we bring in.

20:03

So even if that [A] number is an alien, you wouldn't be marking that it's not a citizen because it doesn't correspond to the voter source data, which is always the most important data.

32:14

So starting with subject match, you will fill that in and when you sorry, it's not it's not working at the moment, but you will have a yes or no option here to select.

32:30

If you select yes, you will continue through the form.

32:33

If you do not have a subject match, you will select no and then you can move.

32:41

You can move to the comments, which is the very last field and just say why it was not a subject match and move on to your next assignment.

32:53

USC.

32:54

This is how the subject match will work as well.

32:57

So it's a yes or no.

32:59

So if you have a subject match, you now move to the are they [a US] citizen, yes or no?
33:06

If yes, you know you look at when that occurred pre or post restoring election and make that determination.

Again, FDNS requires that the DHS-provided voter registration date and/or voting date in the source data must be considered accurate. An officer would therefore be required to create a TECS record against a known U.S. citizen if the voter registration date and/or voting date provided in the DHS data predates their confirmed naturalization date, even if an officer reasonably believes that the DHS source data is not reliable enough to justify creating a TECS record. In other words, the current process is knowingly sweeping known US citizens in as potentially “unlawful voters.”

5. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS




Image 18-FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative PowerPoint Presentation Slide 15

USCIS-FDNS HQ also acknowledges that there are U.S. citizens included in this data and references using Social Security Administration and Department of State data for assessing possible U.S. citizens. They also specifically state that U.S. citizens with petitioning spouses can have their Social Security Numbers inaccurately linked to their alien spouses. Officers, however, were instructed that the petitioning U.S. citizen spouses were “likely entitled to vote.”

Training Video Transcript:

36:30

OK, I'm just going to, I'm going to state a couple of things really quick.

36:34

So first, there will be U.S.

36:37

citizens in this population.

36:39

So we've done the best we can.

36:41

We're going to talk about, you know, how we, the review process at the end, but like, unfortunately, we're relying on the data we have available.

36:48

We have taken it and bet and done batch, batch queries against Social Security Administration and Department of State for US passports.

36:55

But the way that, the way that the systems work, it's not perfect.

37:00

So during your reviews, you will identify U.S.

37:02

citizens.

37:03

So I just want to throw that out there.

37:04

My apologies.

37:05

You know, thank you.

37:06

We're, we're still, we're just doing the best we can.

—

55:41

One thing we've seen is that sometimes USC petitioning spouses, their socials are linked to their alien spouse.

55:53

So one thing to keep in mind is that as you search the social and for example, PCIS, it might be returned to like an alien that I'm for sure the alien spouse.

56:03

But in reality, the social belongs to the petitioning spouse, who is the US citizen who was likely entitled to vote.

56:10

So that's just something to keep in mind.

As USCIS-FDNS HQ has acknowledged, it can be very difficult to determine if a subject is a U.S. citizen or not. They may be natural-born citizens and have no interactions with the federal government that can be easily queried (passports, cross-border travel, etc.), or they may have derived citizenship automatically even if they are not considered natural born. There is no single, clear data source to confirm that a subject is a U.S. citizen. In many cases, the only proof of U.S. citizenship for a person may be held in local or county birth records.

The last approximately 50 minutes of the hour-and-45-minute training video is specifically about derivative citizenship and complex scenarios, mentioned here to illustrate the potential complexity and difficulty in determining if someone is a U.S. citizen.

Here's one example from the Training Video Transcript:

54:20

And if they obtain their permanent residence as a minor look, you know, consider the derivative elements of that.

54:29

I'm not going to go into that right more because right now because the whole, you know, next section is on the Child Citizenship Act and we're going to go over the derivative part of this a bit.

—

56:35

But one thing we have found that the most complicated part or the most challenging part, these are pretty straightforward reviews.

56:43

And but the challenging, the most challenging ones we have seen are when they relate to people who have potentially derive citizenship.

Below is a case example that was discussed in the video.




Image 19 - FDNS Unlawful Voter Initiative PowerPoint Presentation Slide 34

Training Video Transcript:

1:23:53

And for our last example, this particular one is an instance when we talked about having multiple alien numbers or Social Security numbers associated in the systems.

1:24:08

What we were looking at for the particular this particular provided data was the voter name and the voter data was not a complete or exact match.

1:24:21

The DOB information provided only included a year.

1:24:26

[REDACTED] talked about in some instances you may have month and year, full date of birth and some of the other provided data it may only be the year.

1:24:35

This particular example, the year was also off by one year in terms of the partial name hit.

1:24:44

So first name was a match, last name was a match.

1:24:47

There was a little bit of a difference in terms of the formatting.

1:24:51

It was as if the surname had been combined together, but there also was a middle initial provided that middle initial could not be associated to the individual in our systems.

1:25:04

And then the other piece that we're looking at within the data is the address provided.

1:25:09

So the voter information, voter roll provided address when you're looking at our systems, is that an address that has been used on another USCIS filing.

1:25:22

Can we, if not within our systems, can we associate that that that address to the individual using one of our commercial databases?

1:25:32

Clear, accurate, those are all things that as you're reviewing, you'll be sort of looking at in this instance that could not be associated when *you* do a little bit further dive into the two Social Security numbers provided.

1:25:49

One of those Social Security numbers in clear in this particular instance was associated to one individual.

1:25:58

The other Social Security number was actually and clear then associated to the actual voter.

1:26:06

It did require a little bit more of a deep dive in that we, you know, taking a closer look at the other Social Security number provided searches then showed an ACRQ record for [a US] passport issuance.

1:26:22

The other individual had naturalized it was prior to that voting date.

1:26:27

This one just allowed us to then determine, you know, it wasn't a match.

1:26:31

But because of the close similarities, the cross of the two Social Security numbers, the name, it required just a little bit more searching of that other Social Security number to determine if it was a match, if the individual voted and also, you know, were they a citizen prior to voting.

1:26:53

So these examples you'll see sort of common in terms of maybe being associated to more than one alien number, Social Security number.

Officers are expected to complete at *minimum* 40 subject reviews a day, or 5-6 per hour for 8 hours. This means that officers are expected to take no more than 12 minutes to determine if a

subject is a U.S. citizen or not, determine if they are to be considered an “unlawful voter,” and enter a TECS record against them before moving on to the next subject. Officers are reminded that FDNS leadership is tracking their output and will question why they are not meeting quotas.

CLOSING STATEMENT

Anyone reading this account from our client could find themselves (or elements of their identity) linked in the DHS data through “supplemental magic.” If so, will a federal officer use their identity to access their private voter records? Will the officer decide their identity to be that of a U.S. citizen and “lawful voter” within the allotted 12 minutes? Or will they be labeled an “unlawful voter” before the officer proceeds to the next person to meet their quota?

These are critical questions that our client believes must be presented to the American public.